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Prosecutorial Discretion in  an  
Adversary System 
Kenneth J. Melilli* 
I was a prosecutor for nearly five and quite 
possibly, nothing else I ever do will so neatly define who I am 
in the eyes of others. Many students, colleagues, neighbors and 
others that I encounter have an unwarranted confidence that 
they understand my politics, ethics, ambitions and personality 
based upon little more than the fact that  I once held this 
seemingly telling po~i t ion.~ 
I have often resisted, and sometimes even resented, this 
stereotype. In fairness, however, I must confess that I 
identified myself, at least professionally, as a prosecutor. I did 
not consider myself a lawyer as such; lawyers were people who 
represented specific clients. I viewed myself as having a very 
different role, a view shared by many of my prosecutor 
colleagues. My understanding was that my obligation as a 
prosecutor was to the public interest, a n  obligation 
fundamentally different than that of lawyers to their private 
clients. 
Moreover, my image of the prosecutorial function was 
developed even before I became a prosecutor. At least in my 
case, my view of a prosecutor as one not obliged to the interests 
of a particular client was precisely what initially attracted me 
to the profession. Like many of my fellow law students, and 
* Professor of Law, Albany Law School of Union University. I gratehlly 
acknowledge the contributions of Suzi McClosky, Maureen Sladek, and, in 
particular, Patricia Taylor. 
1. From September 1982 through March 1986, I was an Assistant United 
States Attorney in the District of Columbia. From April 1986 through May 1987, I 
was an Assistant United States Attorney in Vermont. 
2. This is not to suggest that there has been any consensus among people as 
to the specific politics, ethics, ambitions and character traits of prosecutors. It is 
merely to suggest that the idea of a "prosecutor" seems to  carry with it a much 
more personal definition than a host of other occupations, including the more 
generic identification of an individual as a lawyer. 
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like many of my own students today,3 I had some personal 
reservations about my role as a lawyer in an  adversarial 
system of dispute resolution. Consequently, I regarded the 
special obligation of prosecutors to "seek justice'" not as an  
additional burden, but rather as the fundamental attraction of 
the position. I viewed the obligation to "seek justice" as a 
liberation from the uneasy commitment to private interests 
inherent in the "ordinary" practice of law.5 
No doubt, people choose to become prosecutors for a variety 
and combination of  reason^.^ There are very few, if any, 
comparable opportunities for relatively novice lawyers to gain 
valuable and marketable courtroom experience. For many, that 
experience is foreseen as challenging and enjoyable. For some, 
the position offers a degree of prestige and future political 
opportunity. Some-fortunately a very few in my experi- 
ence-are driven by an overzealous and insatiable desire to 
rescue the world from criminals. But what may be surprising to 
the reader unfamiliar with prosecutors is that many arrive at 
the position motivated, a t  least in part, by disaffection for the 
"hired gun" model of private law practice. Indeed, I was by no 
means alone in my ambition to prosecute as  a means of 
accomplishing an  objectively different, and subjectively 
superior, code of conduct. Moreover, my guess is that many 
current fledgling and hopeful prosecutors will find a familiar 
chord in the above refrain. 
3. See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of 
the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159 (1958). 
4. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1983) [hereinafter 
MODEL CODE]. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. 
(1991) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. 
5. Because the prosecutor has no identifiable client, he or she must make 
decisions ordinarily made bjr the client. John S. Edwards, Professional 
Responsibilities of the Federal Prosecutor, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 513 (1983); 
John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 174, 
180 11.15 (1965). But, in the words of former Associate Attorney General Stephen 
Trott: 
I can't think of a better job than to be a prosecutor. It's an absolutely 
amazing opportunity. It's a luxury of a lifetime to be able to pursue only 
those things that are right. You are unencumbered by the bad ideas of a 
client who is paying you money. You are only encumbered by your own 
desire to do the right thing and to make sure that justice is done. 
Stephen Trott, Address to J. Frank Coakley National Symposium on Crime (May 
1987), quoted in JOHN J. DOUGLASS, ETMCAL ISSUES IN PROSECUTION 31 (1988). 
6 .  See George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. 
REV. 98, 99 (1975). 
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Is there some point to this monologue other than personal 
remembrances or soulful comradery? I think there is. In fact, I 
believe the way prosecutors view their roles in the adversary 
system provides the most useful tool for unraveling the difficult 
and perplexing problem of prosecutorial ethics. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the prosecutorial 
function from the perspective of the prosecutor. The specific 
context for this examination will be the prosecutor's charging 
decision, which is the most significant aspect of the 
prosecutorial function. The issue is whether, and to what 
extent, a prosecutor's personal assessment of a defendant's 
&t should affect those charging decisions. The article 
examines the extent to which the model of all lawyers as 
adversaries for the interests of their clients does, and should, 
influence a prosecutor's charging decision. 
Part I of the article explores the need for prosecutorial 
charging discretion, the nature and extent of that discretion, 
and the various existing external constraints upon that 
discretion. Part I1 compares various self-imposed standards for 
the exercise of that discretion. Part I11 investigates 
institutional and other factors affecting the prosecutor's 
exercise of charging discretion. Part IV then examines the 
impact of the adversary model of lawyer behavior upon the 
prosecutorial charging function. Finally, Part V offers 
recommendations for prosecutorial standards in the exercise of 
charging discretion. 
The decision to charge an individual with a crime is the 
most important function exercised by a prosecutor. No 
government official can effect a greater influence over a citizen 
than the prosecutor who charges that citizen with a crime.' In 
many cases, the prosecutor determines the fate of those 
ac~used,~ at least in those cases where the evidence or 
statutory sentencing structure renders the ultimate outcome of 
the prosecution largely a foregone conclu~ion.~ Even when the 
7. DAVID M. NISSMAN & ED HAGEN, THE PROSECUTION FU CTION 2 (1982); 
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1940). 
8. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REV. 
152 1, 1522 (1981) [hereinafter Vorenberg I]. 
9. Id. at 1525-26. 
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criminal charge does not result in conviction, the mere filing of 
a criminal charge can have a devastating effect upon an 
individual's life,'' including potential pretrial incarceration," 
loss of employment,12 embarrassment and loss of 
reputation,13 the financial cost of a criminal defense,14 and 
the emotional stress and anxiety incident to awaiting a final 
disposition of the charges.15 Such consequences may well have 
a permanent effect that is not cured even by an acquittal at  
trial.16 As a consequence, many prosecutors do, and all should, 
regard the possibility of charging an innocent person as "the 
single most frightening aspect of the prosecutor's job."17 
In exercising the charging function, the prosecutor enjoys 
broad, indeed virtually unlimited, discretion.'' Indeed, the 
prosecutor has been fairly described "as the single most 
powerful figure in the administration of criminal justi~e."'~ 
The prosecutor determines not only which cases and 
defendants to prosecute2' but also which charges to bring? 
10. NISSMAN & HAGEN, supra note 7, a t  13. 
11. FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT 
WITH A CRIME 3 (1969); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A 
Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 232 n.152 (1988). 
12. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 84 
(1975) [hereinafter FREEDMAN I]; MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' 
ETHICS 218 (1990) [hereinafter FREEDMAN 111; Fisher, supra note 11, at 232 n.152. 
13. KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 190 
(1969); FREEDMAN I, supra note 12, a t  84; FREEDMAN U, supra note 12, a t  218; 
MILLER, supra note 11, at 3; Fisher, supra note 11, at 232 n.152; Vorenberg I, 
supra note 8, at 1525. 
14. FREEDMAN I, supra note 12, a t  84; FREEDMAN 11, supra note 12, at 218; 
MILLER, supra note 11, at 3; Fisher, supra note 11, at 232 n.152; Vorenberg I, 
supra note 8, at 1525. 
15. FREEDMAN I, supra note 12, a t  84; FREEDMAN 11, supm note 12, at 218; 
Fisher, supra note 11, at 232 n.152; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, a t  1525. 
16. K e ~ e t h  E. North, Policy Guidelines-Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 15 
THE PROSECUTOR 132, 133 (1979). 
17. NISSMAN & HAGEN, supra note 7, at 13. 
18. See, e.g., Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); NATIONAL 
DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, THE PROSECUTOR'S SCREENING FUNCTION: CASE 
EVALUATION AND CONTROL 5 (1973); Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, 
Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 474 (1976); Sarah J. Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion: An 
Overview, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 383, 418 (1976); Vorenberg I, supra note 8, a t  
1525; James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 
1976 DUKE L.J. 651, 678 [hereinafter Vorenberg 111. 
19. Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, at 477. 
20. Id. at 476. 
21. Id. a t  480-81. This decision may be of greater practical significance than 
the decision to charge. For example, i t  may be a foregone conclusion that an 
individual who sells controlled substances to an undercover officer will be 
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The prosecutor generally retains the discretion to revisit the 
initial charging decision, either by reinstating voluntarily 
dismissed charges or  by dismissing or altering previous 
charges.22 A decision not to prosecute, or to dismiss a pending 
prosecution, may be made even in the face of sufficient 
evidence for con~iction.~~ And indeed, a substantial percentage 
of arrests results in either declined or voluntarily aborted 
 prosecution^.^^ The extent of this discretion has been 
described as "the central issue today" in the American criminal 
justice system.25 
Some authors have charged that the concentration of 
discretionary power in the prosecutor is ~nnecessary,~~ 
"resulting from default rather than a conscious legislative 
judgment."27 Some have opined that charging deci- 
sions-particularly decisions not to prosecute-are sometimes 
made for political, personal or other capricious  reason^.^' As a 
result, there is a growing demand for some limitation upon 
prosecutorial discreti~n;~ either by legislat i~n,~~ adminis- 
trative reg~lation,~' or centralized decision-making within the 
prosecuted. But the decision to charge the offense as either a felony sale or a 
misdemeanor possession, perhaps based upon the quantity of drugs involved, may 
be of terrific consequence to the defendant in terms of likely punishment. 
22. Id. at 478. Although office policies may determine charging decisions to a 
degree, individual prosecutors also exercise considerable discretion in the cases 
assigned to their personal attention. Fisher, supra note 11, at  205, 255. In some 
cases, individual prosecutors in nonsupervisory positions may possess and exercise 
authority to charge or dismiss individual cases. Even when the formal authority to 
charge or dismiss is limited to prosecutors in supervisory positions, however, line 
assistants still can exercise great influence upon those decisions by virtue of their 
superior familiarity with the cases assigned to their individual caseloads. 
23. Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 532 (1970). 
24. Cox, supra note 18, at  392. 
25. Jack M. Kress, Progress and Prosecution, 423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 99, 109 (1976). 
26. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 222. 
27. Vorenberg 11, supra note 18, at 680. 
28. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 224. 
29. DAVIS, supra note 13, at 165, 216-17; DOUGLASS, supra note 5, a t  226-27; 
Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, at 490. 
30. See, e.g., Vorenberg 11, supra note 18, at  680-81. Professor Vorenberg offers 
the possibility of legislation requiring prosecutors to charge the most serious 
offense supported by probable cause, although he acknowledges that it would be 
unrealistic to expect such legislation in the short run, and allows for the possibility 
that there may be some circumstances where some discretion should be permitted. 
31. See, e.g., Ernest van den Haag, Limiting Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 19 (1984). Dr. van den Haag proposes a rule 
requiring prosecutors to bring all charges where there is or likely will be sufficient 
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prosecutorial agency.s2 
Nevertheless, the notion of broad, prosecutorial charging 
discretion enjoys much support.3s significantly curtailing 
prosecutorial discretion would accomplish consistency at the 
cost of individualized justicees4 If discretion to  charge is 
justified, then that justification necessarily extends to the 
discretion not to charge.35 And that discretion justifies not 
only eliminating unprovable casess6 but also protecting 
citizens from charges that do not advance societal  interest^.^' 
Whatever disagreement exists about the appropriate extent 
of prosecutorial discretion, there is a consensus that some 
degree of discretion is ine~itable.~' To some extent, this 
consensus is born from a recognition that the resources of the 
criminal justice system do not permit the prosecution of all 
offenders.3g More significantly, even. those who would limit 
prosecutorial discretion do not generally target prosecutorial 
assessment of the nature and strength of the evidenceO4O 
Within the broad notion of prosecutorial discretion, a 
distinction must be made between factors that lend themselves 
t o  some degree of systematization and those that do not.41 The 
former category focuses upon offenses generally, such as 
prosecutorial decisions not to enforce anachronistic penal laws 
like adultery, or decisions to charge felony sales of small 
quantities of controlled substances as misdemeanor 
possessions. The latter category would include case-specific 
evidence to make conviction possible, with a possible exception for cases that 
cannot lead to prison sentences. 
32. See, e.g., North, supra note 16, at 133 (calling for the establishment of 
uniform charging policies within a prosecutorial agency). 
33. See, e.g., Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Charles 
D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 427 
(1960); Note, Nonfeasance: A Threat to the Prosecutors' Discretion, 30 IND. L.J. 74, 
78-79 (1954). 
34. Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1971). 
35. Breitel, supra note 33, at 430. 
36. Note, supra note 33, at  76. 
37. Cf. Fisher, supra note 11, at 231-32. 
38. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 13, at 195; DOUGLASS, supm note 5, at  2; 
Breitel, supra note 33, at 427. 
39. Jackson, supra note 7, at 5; North, supra note 16, at 133. 
40. See Vorenberg I, supra note 8, at  1547. 
41. See genemlly, Abrams, supra note 34, at 11; Charles W. Thomas & W. 
Anthony Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 507, 513-17 
(1976) (classifying fadors which influence charging decisions as objective or 
subjective). 
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factors, such as the quantity and quality of the evidence of 
guilt. There is no serious quarrel with the proposition that a 
prosecutor must engage in such case-specific eval~ations,4~ 
and most would agree that these evaluations require that the 
prosecutor make some factual findings:3 including, in many 
cases, assessments of the credibility of witnessed4 It is this 
latter category of discretion, or case-specific assessment, with 
which we are here concerned. And there can be no serious 
dispute that this type of discretion is not only inevitable, but 
also desirable.45 
The desirability of case-specific evaluations by prosecutors 
becomes clearer when one considers that the alternative is not 
a system without discretion, but rather a system in which case- 
specific discretion is abdicated entirely to the police. Police 
officers have discretion to arrest or not to arrest:6 and the 
exercise of that discretion enjoys a good measure of public 
expectation and support!7 They may warn for minor 
 infraction^.^^ Even in serious cases, police officers sometimes 
evaluate the credibility of witnesses in exercising their 
d i s ~ r e t i o n . ~ ~  Police officers are selective, not only in making 
arrests, but also in determining where to devote limited 
42. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 11, at 34. 
43. See Fisher, supra note 11, at  229-30. 
44. H. Richard Uviller, The Unworthy Victim: Police Discretion in the Credibility 
Call, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1984, at  15, 31. 
45. Those who criticize American prosecutors as possessing unnecessary 
discretion frequently point to their German counterparts as a model of a more 
desirable system "where the discretionary power of prosecutors is so slight as to be 
almost nonexistent." DAVIS, supra note 13, a t  224. See also id. at 191-95. It is true 
that the German prosecutor theoretically has no discretion and is compelled by law 
to prosecute all offenders (with certain limited exceptions). Klaus Sessar, 
Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, in THE PROSECUTOR 255, 255-57 (William F. 
McDonald ed., 11 Sage Criminal Justice System Annuals, 1979). However, there is 
considerably more discretion-at least in the case-specific evaluation sense of that 
term-in practice than in theory. Id. at  262. German prosecutors do dismiss cases 
for insufficient evidence, id. at 264, and German prosecutors use problems of proof 
to create charging discretion, id. at  272. 
46. DAVIS, supra note 13, at  18, 81-83; Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not 
to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of 
Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960); LaFave, supra note 23, a t  532 n.2; Note, supra 
note 33, at  75. 
47. Uviller, supra note 44, a t  28; Gregory H. Williams, Police Discretion: The 
Institutional Dilemma-Who Is in Charge?, 68 IOWA L. REV. 431, 432 (1983); Note, 
supra note 33, a t  75. 
48. Goldstein, supra note 46, at 559 11.27. 
49. Uviller, supra note 44, at 28. 
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investigative resources,50 and these decisions are not normally 
controlled by the prosec~tor.~' 
Obviously, potential prosecutions screened out by police 
decisions not to investigate or not to arrest will ordinarily 
receive no review by the prosecutor's office.52 But the cases 
which the police bring to the prosecutor--either in the form of 
a completed arrest, an  application for an arrest warrant, or a 
request for a grand jury investigation-will ordinarily receive 
some degree of independent scrutiny by the prosecutor. If that 
independent scrutiny does not take place-either because of 
some external or self-imposed limitation on the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion-then the decision to charge will 
effectively have been made solely by the police. 
Nevertheless, there are prosecutors who do not recognize 
the power to, or necessity for, reviewing police charging 
decisions.53 In some cases, prosecutors rely upon the arrest 
warrant, the grand jury or the preliminary hearing as a 
substitute for their own case-specific e ~ a l u a t i o n . ~ ~  None of 
these procedures, however, provides a sigdicant check upon 
the prosecutor's decision to charge, and consequently, none 
provides any justification for the prosecutor's abdication or 
deference to the case-specific discretion of police officers. 
The arrest warrant55 is obtained by an ex parte 
application to the court. Generally, the decision to issue the 
warrant is based solely on the affidavit of a police officer, and 
the court does not make any further inquiry of the officer a t  
the time the warrant is issued. Moreover, when the officer is 
not an actual witness to the crime, the officer's affidavit simply 
relays information from others whose credibility has been 
evaluated, if at all, by the officer.56 The warrant is issued 
upon the minimal standard of "probable cause" that a crime 
50. Id. at 15; Breitel, supra note 33, at 429. 
51. DOUGLASS, supra note 5, at 157. 
52. BRIAN A. GROSMAN, THE FQOSECUTOR: AN INQUIRY INTO THE EXERCISE OF 
DISCRETION 44 (1969); Abrams, supra note 34, at 2 n.4; Goldstein, supra note 46, 
at 543; LaFave, supra note 23, at 532 n.2. 
53. JOAN E. JACOBY, THE PROSECUTOR'S CHARGING DECISION: A POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE 15 (1977). 
54. Id. 
55. Most arrests do not require a warrant. See United States v. Watson, 423 
U.S. 411 (1976). Most arrests are, in fact, made without an arrest warrant. WAYNE 
R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 141-44 (1985). 
56. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of 
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1164 (1960). 
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has been committed and that the individual named in the 
warrant committed it.57 The issuance of the arrest warrant, 
then, is hardly a significant check upon the police officer's 
judgment or the prosecutor's acquiescence theretoes8 
Likewise, the grand jury is not a significant check on the 
prosecutor's, or police officer's, decision to charge. Only about 
one-half of the states require a grand jury indictment, and even 
that requirement is generally limited to fe10nies.~' The grand 
jury process is ex parte and entirely controlled by the 
prosecutor, trial rules of evidence are not generally applicable, 
and the standard is, again, merely probable cause.60 For these 
reasons, the grand jury offers little, if anything, in the way of a 
screening mechanism on  prosecution^,^^ and is frequently 
referred to is a "rubber stamp" of the prose~utor.~~ 
The preliminary hearing .exists in most statesa3 and, in 
contrast with the grand jury, is a judicial proceeding in which 
the defense participates. Nevertheless, the minimal standard of 
probable cause is routinely and easily met by the 
go~ernment.~~ Moreover, where a grand jury indictment is 
available and returned prior to the date of the preliminary 
hearing, the preliminary hearing is generally una~ailable.~~ 
For these reasons, the preliminary hearing, like the arrest 
warrant and grand jury indictment, cannot be regarded as a 
significant check on the prosecutor's charging di~cretion.~~ 
57. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). This evidentiary standard is less 
exacting than the "preponderance of evidence" standard applicable to most civil 
cases, CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
4 3.03 (2d ed. 1986), and has been described by the United States Supreme Court 
as a "substantial chance" or "fair probability" of criminal activity. Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13, 246 (1983). 
58. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 56, at  1164-65. 
59. 1 SARA S. BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW & PRACTICE 
$ 2.03 (Cum. Supp. 1991); DAVID W. NEUBAUER, AMERICA'S COURTS AND THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 201 (2d ed. 1984). 
60. See, e.g., George T. Frampton, Jr., Some Practical and Ethical Problems of 
Prosecuting Public Officials, 36 M D .  L. REV. 5, 19 (1976); Vorenberg I, supra note 
8, at 1537-38. 
61. Goldstein, supra note 56, at  1171; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, a t  1537-38, 
1556. 
62. Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, at 483-84; Frampton, supra note 60, a t  
6; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 177; Vorenberg 11, supra note 18, a t  678, 
63. See Goldstein, supra note 56, a t  1169 n.57. 
64. Goldstein, supra note 56, at 1166, 1183; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, a t  1538. 
65. Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, at  483-84; James R. Kavanaugh, 
Representing the People of Illinois: Prosecutorial Power and Its Limitations, 27 
DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 636 (1978). 
66. Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, at  483-84; Goldstein, supra note 56, a t  
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Indeed, as long as the government meets the probable 
cause threshold, there is essentially no judicial review of the 
prosecutor's charging decision.67 Consequently, in most cases 
the trial itself is the only significant, formal stage of the 
process that protects the erroneously accused? By that point, 
of course, many of the incidents of suffering the formal criminal 
accusation are irreparable.69 Therefore, a prosecutor who fails 
to exercise case-specific charging discretion is, a t  least 
potentially, permitting the defendant to be brought to trial on 
either the decision of a police officer or, even more alarmingly, 
on the accusation of an individual from whom the police officer 
merely takes a report. 
In the absence of any significant limitations within the 
criminal justice system upon prosecutors' exercise or abdication 
of their discretionary authority, one might expect to find more 
significant restraints in the ethical rules governing prosecutors' 
conduct. As a general proposition, however, the rules of ethical 
conduct for prosecutors' charging decisions require no more 
than the same minimalistic "probable cause" required by the 
criminal, adjudicative process.70 
Virtually every state has adopted, as its standard of 
professional responsibility for lawyers, some variation of either 
the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct or the American Bar Association Model Code of 
Professional R e ~ ~ o n s i b i l i t ~ . ~ '  The Model Code, which was 
1168-69, 1172; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, at 1556. 
67. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Powell v. 
Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 
167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.DM.Y. 1961); 
State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 166 N.W.2d 255, 260 (Wis. 1969). See also 
DOUGLASS, supra note 5, at 2; Kress, supra note 25, at  114. The usual reasons 
Aven for this hands-off approach is the constitutional notion of separation of 
powers, see, e.g., Cox, 342 F.2d a t  171-72; Pzlgach, 193 F. Supp. at 634; Philip J. 
Cardinale & Steven Feldman, The Federal Courts and the Right to 
Nondiscriminatory Administration of the Criminal Law: A Critical View, 29 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 659, 689 (1978); Cox, supra note 18, at  394, the peculiarly 
executive function of weighing factors such as the allocation of prosecutorial 
resources, see, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480-81 (D.C. Cir. 
1967), and avoidance of deterring prosecutorial beneficence, Cardinale & Feldmdn, 
supra, at  690. Judicial review of prosecutorial charging discretion is generally 
limited to those cases in which the defendant can show that criminal charges were 
brought on the basis of some impermissible discrimination, such as race, gender or 
religion. Vorenberg I, supm note 8, a t  1540; Vorenberg 11, supra note 18, at 679. 
68. Goldstein, supra note 56, at 1172; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, at  1523. 
69. See supra text accompanying notes 10-16. 
70. See Frampton, supra note 60, at  19-20. 
71. See generally NATIONAL REPORTER ON LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
adopted by the American Bar Association in 1 9 6 9 , ~ ~  is divided 
into three sections: canons, ethical considerations and 
disciplinary rules. Only the disciplinary rules are intended to 
be mandatory, as the first two categories are intended to be 
aspirational only.73 The relevant disciplinary rule prohibits 
prosecutors from instituting criminal charges which they know 
or should know are not based upon probable cause.74 The 
relevant aspirational pronouncement of the Model Code is less 
precise, encouraging prosecutors to "seek justice."75 This 
admonition appears throughout ethical codes of conduct,76 
case and ~ornrnentary,~~ but is nowhere clearly defined.79 
RESPONSIBILITY (University Publications of America 1991). 
72. John F. Sutton, Jr., How Vulnerable Is the Code of Professional 
Responsibility?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 497, 497 (1979). 
73. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Preliminary Statement. See also Geoffrey 
C. Hazard, Jr., Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and Professional Aspirations, 30 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 571, 572 (1982); Sutton, supra note 72, at 514. This distinction has not 
always been 'followed in practice, a problem which the American Bar Association 
(ABA) hoped to remedy with the subsequent adoption of the Model Rules. Hazard, 
supra, at  573-74; James H. Stark, Review Essay, The Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 12 CONN. L. REV. 948, 953, 958 (1980). The Model Rules, in contrast to 
the Model Code, speak in terms of mandatory rules, with accompanying 
commentary. Hazard, supra, at 574. 
74. "A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause 
to be instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges 
are not supported by probable cause." MODEL CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-103(A). 
75. The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual 
advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special 
duty exists because: (1) the prosecutor represents the sovereign and 
therefore should use restraint in the discretionary exercise of 
governmental powers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute; (2) 
during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may make 
decisions normally made by an individual client, and those affecting the 
public interest should be fair to all; and (3) in our system of criminal 
justice the accused is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts. 
MODEL CODE, supra note 4, EC 7-13. 
76. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 3.8 cmt. ("A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice . . . ."); I STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Standard 3-l.l(c) (Am. Bar Ass'n, 2d ed. 1980) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to 
seek justice, not merely to convict.") [hereinafter ABA ~OSECUTION STANDARDS]; 
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 5 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1908) ("The primary 
duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that 
justice is done."). 
77. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 696 (1985); Berger v. 
United States, 295 US. 78, 88 (1935). 
78. See Carol A. Corrigan, On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
537, 537-38 (1986); Edwards, supra note 5, a t  511; Felkenes, supra note 6, at 109; 
Fisher, supra note 11, at 219; H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and 
Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 
1070 (1975). 
79. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: 
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Although the Model Rules are generally regarded as 
reflecting a certain distrust of the adversary system and a 
desire to restrain the zeal of attorney  advocate^,^^^ the only 
limitation the Rules place on prosecutors' charging discretion 
continues to be the familiar, and unimposing, probable cause 
standard." The ABA Prosecution Standards, which have been 
adopted in many  jurisdiction^,^^ do permit prosecutors to take 
into consideration their reasonable doubt about the defendant's 
actual and do recommend charging based on sufficient 
admissible evidence t o  support a con~iction.~~ However, like 
the Model Code and Model Rules, the Prosecution Standards 
only sanction charges known not to  be supported by probable 
cause? 
An ethical prerequisite of probable cause is essentially 
meaningless. Probable cause is little more than heightened 
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 46 (1991). Not surprisingly, this 
nebulous admonition is not an independent basis for disciplinary action. See Fisher, 
supra note 11, at  218-19. 
80. See Stark, supra note 73, at  965, 972. 
81. "The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a 
charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause . . . ." MODEL 
RULES, supra note 4, Rule 3.8(a). See also FREEDMAN 11, supra note 12, a t  222. If 
anything, the Model Rules formulation appears to sound a retreat from the Model 
Code limitation. A violation of Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules appears to require 
actual knowledge of the absence of probable cause, while DR 7-103(A) of the Model 
Code appears to allow disciplinary action on the basis of the constructive 
knowledge of the prosecutor in some instances. See supra note 74. Charging 
someone with a criminal violation solely for the purpose of harassment is so 
manifestly improper that it need hardly be mentioned. DOUGLASS, supra note 5, at  
235; MILLER, supra note 11, at  43. A rule that proscribes only charging with the 
knowledge that probable cause is absent is little more than a restatement of the 
unremarkable prohibition of charging solely for the purpose of harassment. 
82. See MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 3.8 cmt. 
83. "Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in 
exercising his or her discretion are: (i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the 
accused is in fact guilty . . . ." ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 76, 
Standard 3-3.903). 
84. "A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the 
continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible 
evidence to support a conviction." ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 76, 
Standard 3-3.9(a). 
85. "It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute, or cause to be 
instituted, or to permit the continued pendency of criminal charges when it is 
known that the charges are not supported by probable cause." ABA PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS, supra note 76, Standard 3-3.9(a). 
For a further discussion of the three-tiered standard of the ABA Prosecution 
Standards, see FREEDMAN I, supra note 12, at 86; FREEDMAN 11, supra note 12, at  
222; H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: 
Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1155-56 (1973). 
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suspicion, and it is not even remotely sufficient to screen out 
individuals who are factually not g~il ty. '~ More importantly, 
the criminal justice system itself provides for an early finding 
of probable cause," thus allowing the ministerial prosecutor 
to avoid any caseapecific evaluation, abdicating both to the 
antecedent judgment of the police officer and the subsequent 
determination of the court or the grand jury. 
The recommended threshold of the ABA Prosecution 
Standards-sufficient admissible evidence to support a 
conviction-is likewise far too easily satisfied to provide any 
real limitation upon, or incentive to exercise, case-specific 
evaluation by the prosecutor. The standard is essentially that 
of a prima facie case, i.e., evidence sufficient to survive a 
motion for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the 
government's case." Not only does that standard fail to 
require the prosecutor to consider defenses known to the 
prosecutor,89 but it also fails to require the prosecutor to 
evaluate witness credibility. Instead, the prosecutor is merely 
required to evaluate whether the government's evidence, if 
accepted, establishes the elements of the charged offense.g0 
Motions for judgments of acquittal are rarely successful,g1 and 
an equivalent ethical standard falls far short of preventing the 
prosecution of cases that should not, or even cannot, result in 
Other charging standards, lacking the external 
enforcement mechanisms of the professional responsibility 
86. See FREEDMAN I, supra note 12, a t  85; Frampton, supra note 60, at  19; 
Frank J. Rernington & Wayne A. Logan, Frank Miller and the Decision to 
Prosecute, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 159, 169 (1991). 
87. If the process is initiated by an arrest warrant or an indictment, then the 
court or the grand jury, respectively, will have determined. probable cause prior to 
the defendant's arrest or summons. In any event, if the defendant is to be held 
beyond the initial appearance, there must be a judicial determination of probable 
cause. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). 
88. Uviller, supra note 85, at 1156. 
89. Frampton, supra note 60, a t  20. 
90. Uviller, supra note 85, a t  1156. On a motion for judgment of acquittal, the 
court must deny the motion if a rational jury could find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In ruling on the motion, the court must draw all 
reasonable inferences, and resolve all credibility disputes, in favor of the 
government. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US.  307, 319 (1979). Consequently, 
a prosecutor who self-imposes that same standard assumes that the government's 
evidence is accurate and uncontested. 
91. Cf. Kaplan, supra note 5, a t  183. 
92. FREEDMAN I, supra note 12, at  86; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 183. 
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codes, are also available to the prosecutor. The National 
District Attorneys Association has adopted essentially the same 
standards as those found in the ABA Prosecution  standard^.'^ 
They recommend that a prosecutor file only charges which can 
be substantiated by admissible evidence at  trial,g4 and list 
"[dloubt as to the accused's guilt" as a "factor[] which may be 
c~nsidered."~~ The United States Department of Justice has 
issued standards requiring that a federal prosecutor go forward 
with a prosecution only when "the admissible evidence will 
probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a convi~tion."~~ 
The commentary equates this standard with that necessary t o  
survive a motion for judgment of acquittal:? the same 
standard discussed above.98 
One thing is clear from an examination of these standards. 
While Due Process requires that a conviction must be based 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubtPg there is no 
comparable degree of certainty required of  prosecutor^.'^^ 
Instead, the ethical rules, which focus upon the morality of the 
private practitioner,lO' and which do not distinguish 
prosecutors from the ordinary model of zealous advocacy,102 
have settled upon the virtually meaningless requirement of 
probable cause. This may be more dangerous than no standard 
a t  all. If a prosecutor can find no internal ethical command, he 
or she may adopt the ethical minimum of probable cause as the 
only morality for exercising charging discretion.lo3 
I t  is questionable whether professional disciplinary rules 
93. See DOUGLASS, supra note 5, a t  28. 
94. NATIONAL DIST. AlTORNEXS ASS'N, NATIONAL PI30 SECUTION STANDARDS 
5 43.3 (2d ed. 1991). See also FREEDMAN 11, supra note 12, a t  222. 
95. NATIONAL DIST. A ~ R N E Y S  ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 
fj 42.3(a) (2d ed. 1991). 
96. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION pt. B.2 (1980). 
See also Edwards, supra note 5, at  519. 
97. U.S. DEF'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION pt. B.2 cmt. 
(1980). 
98. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
99. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US. 307, 316 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
364 (1970). 
100. MILLER, supra note 11, at  22; Kavanaugh, supra note 65, at 633. 
101. DOUGLASS, supra note 5, a t  33-34. 
102. Zacharias, supra note 79, at  52. 
103. Id. at 103. 
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influence the behavior of lawyers to any significant degree? 
Such rules are infrequently and lightly enforced,'" and they 
are perceived in some quarters as merely aspirational and not 
mandatory.lo6 Moreover, the requirements of such rules are 
generally not burdensome, as the drafters of disciplinary rules 
have historically been cautious in their approaches.lO' As a 
result, some lawyers set for themselves ethical standards more 
demanding than those required by disciplinary rules.lo8 
Prosecutors, too, are likely uninfluenced in their charging 
decisions by external ethical constraints. Prosecutors are rarely 
disciplined for violating rules of professional responsibility. log 
Beyond the barely meaningful requirement of probable cause, 
the ethical rules and court decisions are too general to provide 
limits or guidance.l1° As a consequence, charging and other 
decisions must be made by pr&ecutors on the basis of 
"personal standards of integrity and fairness.""' 
Even within the prosecutors' office, charging policies tend 
to have little impact on the case-specific evaluations 
undertaken by individual line assistants. Office charging 
policies tend to focus on offense categories rather than the 
quantitative and qualitative evaluations of evidence in 
individual cases.'" Office guidelines tend to be broad and 
flexible, in part to avoid defense motions claiming violations of 
internal g~idelines."~ Finally, decisions by prosecutors, 
including decisions to commence or continue criminal 
prosecutions, must often be made spontaneously and 
instinctively with infrequent opportunities for serious internal 
review.l14 
104. Murray L. Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 953, 958. 
105. Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. 
REV. 639, 648-49 (1981). 
106. See L. Ray Patterson, A Preliminary Rationalization of the Law of Legal 
Ethics, 57 N.C. L. REV. 519, 521 (1979). 
107. See Charles Frankel, Code of Professional Responsibility, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 
874, 874-75 (1976) (review). 
108. See Schwartz, supra note 104, at  959. 
109. FREEDMAN I, supra note 12, at 96. I t  is not even clear that federal 
prosecutors are subject to discipline for violation of state ethical rules. Zacharias, 
supra note 79, a t  106 & n.252. 
110. Fisher, supra note 11, at 212; Frampton, supra note 60, at 8. 
111. Edwards, supra note 5, at  514. 
112. Cf. Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, at 488-89. 
113. Vorenberg 11, supra note 18, at  680. 
114. Cf. DOUGLASS, supra note 5, at  33. 
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Clearly, then, so much responsibility is vested in the hands 
of the individual prosecutor that much of the success of the 
criminal justice system depends upon the quality and integrity 
of  prosecutor^."^ Specifically, the key is the individual 
prosecutor's perception of his o r  her professional role, 
particularly in the context of the charging decision.ll6 
Most prosecutors are, in fact, attentive to the ethical 
appropriateness of their behavior117 and, in particular, 
concerned about the fairness of their charging  decision^."^ 
Nevertheless, in describing how prosecutors view their 
professional roles,'19 including the standards used in the 
exercise of their charging d iscre t i~n , '~~  few generlizations are 
safe. "Prosecutors areneither homogenous [*]or fungible," and 
consequently, differences exist both among offices and among 
individuals within the same office.lZ1 
All prosecutors agree, as they must,'" that probable 
cause is required in pursuing criminal charges.lZ3 Many 
prosecutors impose a higher standard of probability upon their 
charging decisions,'% but not all agree they should do so.'" 
As a general rule, prosecutors also require, a t  least a t  some 
point prior to trial, that the government's evidence be sufficient 
to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal.lZ6 Furthermore, 
virtually all prosecutors require, a t  least at the time of trial, 
that the government's case present a reasonable likelihood of 
conviction. lZ7 
That prosecutors impose upon themselves a "reasonable 
115. See Benjamin R. Civiletti, Preface to U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL PROSECUTION (1980); Felkenes, supra note 6, at 98; Jackson, supra note 
7, at 6. 
116. See JACOBY, supra note 53, at 15; Pamela J. Utz, l b o  Models of 
Prosecutorial Professionalism, in THE PROSECUTOR 99 (William F. McDonald ed., 11 
Sage Criminal Justice System Annuals, 1979). 
117. See DOUGLASS, supra note 5, a t  vi. 
118. See Felkenes, supra note 6, at 109. 
119. Fisher, supra note 11, at 214. 
120. See Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof 
of Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 445 (1987); Utz, supra note 116, at 103. 
121. DOUGLASS, supra note 5, a t  1. 
122. See supra text accompanying notes 70-87. 
123. See NISSMAN & HAGEN, supra note 7, a t  13. 
124. MILLER, supra note 11, a t  34. 
125. Cf Martin H. Belsky, On Becoming and Being a Prosecutor, 78 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 1485, 1517-18 (1984) (review essay). 
126. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 182. See also Kavanaugh, supra note 65, at 
634-35. 
127. MILLER, supra note 11, a t  35. 
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likelihood of conviction" standard is entirely unremarkable. 
Given limited resources and full, if not burgeoning, caseloads, 
there is simply no practical and legitimate reason for a 
prosecutor t o  proceed to trial in a case that has no reasonable 
prospect of resulting in a conviction. Thus, as a purely tactical 
matter, prosecutors will not proceed, to trial at  least, with 
cases presenting no reasonable likelihood of convi~tion.'~~ 
The truly ethical question is presented by a case where, 
despite evidence presenting a reasonable likelihood of 
conviction, the prosecutor has some doubt as to the actual guilt 
of the defendant. Some prosecutors present such cases to the 
jury at trial, due either to an unwillingness to act on their 
personal judgment or a belief that they are not permitted to  do 
so.'" Others refuse to seek convictions in such cases, 
requiring, in addition to a convictable case, that they be 
personally satisfied of the defendant's guilt.130 Indeed; some 
prosecutors require that they be convinced to the same extent 
that the law requires for the jury to return a guilty verdict, i.e., 
beyond a reasonable doubt.lsl 
The ultimate issue addressed in this article-whether 
prosecutors should incorporate their personal judgments as to 
defendants' guilt into their charging decisions-is a question 
which will be further examined in Parts N and V of this 
article. Before doing so, however, it will be useful to examine 
certain factors which affect prosecutors7 charging decisions and 
consequently impact the resolution of that ultimate issue. 
American lawyers are predisposed to be zealous 
advocates.ls2 Trial lawyers in particular tend to target 
128. Id.; Kaplan, supra note 5, a t  180. 
129. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U .  
CHI. L. REV. 50, 63 (1968); Fisher, supra note 11, at  229-30; Gross, supra note 
120, at 445. 
130. MILLER, supra note 11, at  36 n.15, 42; Corrigan, supra note 78, a t  539; 
Kaplan, supra note 5, at  178. See also Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, at 479. 
For a recommendation that ethical codes be revised to require prosecutors to have 
a good faith belief in the factual guilt of the defendant, see Zacharias, supra note 
79, at  49-50. 
131. MILLER, supra note 11, at  22; Utz, supra note 116, a t  110. Cf. NISSMAN & 
HAGEN, supra note 7, a t  13. 
132. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, !L'HE LAW OF 
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 327-28 
686 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
"victory" as their goal.ls3 And young lawyers tend to 
assimilate these values for a variety of reasons. 
Law schools generally emphasize litigation, creating a 
focus on victory as  a professional goal? Law school training 
in professional responsibility tends, quite understandably, to 
focus upon the private pra~t i t ioner , '~~ whose obligation, in 
significant part, is to zealous advocacy on behalf of the 
particular client.ls6 As a general proposition, the adversary 
model is not the subject of a great deal of formal scrutiny.137 
Law students who are suspicious of the adversary system often 
shed their reservations,'" either before or shortly after 
entering practice. The transition from law school to practice 
often parallels the adoption of the perspective of an  advocate 
unconcerned about the discovery of truth.lsg Litigators in 
particular may become "amoral technician[s] committed to 
winning the adversary battle."140 
I t  is with this indoctrination that many individuals enter 
into service as prosecutors. Many of these individuals are 
young, inexperienced, and little-prepared for the responsibility 
of exercising charging discretion.141 When they arrive, they 
are provided with some degree of training in adversarial skills 
and general office policies, but they are given little if any 
education in prosecutorial ethics and the exercise of case- 
specific charging di~cret i0n. l~~ Indeed, some prosecutors lack 
the training necessary to appreciate even the existence of their 
case-specific charging discretion. 
(Supp. 1988). 
133. See James Marshall, Lawyers, Truth and the Zero-Sum Game, 47 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 919, 921 (1972). 
134. See id. at 922. 
135. See DOUGLASS, supra note 5, a t  v, 34. 
136. See MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.3 cmt.; MODEL CODE, supra note 4, 
Canon 7. See also Patterson, supra note 106, at  519. 
137. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U .  PA. L. 
REV. 1031, 1050 (1975) [hereinafter Frankel 111. 
138. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 90 (1988). 
139. See MARVIN E .  FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 22-26 (1980). 
140. R.J. Gerber, Victory vs. Truth: The Adversary System and Its Ethics, 19 
A m .  ST. L.J. 3, 4 (1987). 
141. See DOUGLASS, supra note 5, a t  5, 34; Fisher, supra note 11, at  255-56. 
142. JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY 241-42 (1957); Belsky, 
supra note 125, at  1508-09; Fisher, supra note 11, a t  206, 257. But cf. DOUGLASS, 
supra note 5, at 75 (noting an increase in office training of prosecutors in the area 
of professional responsibility in recent years). 
143. See JACOBY, supra note 53, at 15. 
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Although variations in prosecutors' offices and in 
individual prosecutors make generalizations somewhat 
risky,14 many offices seek to accomplish some form of central 
control over charging discretion by restricting t h a t  
discretion-particularly the initial screening function-to 
experienced, supervisory  prosecutor^.'^^ Nevertheless, the 
initial charging decision will frequently be made in a matter of 
minutes, given the necessity of processing many arrested 
individuals through the initial judicial appearance in  a very 
short time.'46 This brief case evaluation will typically be 
made solely on the basis of information from a police officer 
and, if applicable (and then typically only indirectly), from the 
victim of the crime.14' The information provided in  this 
limited context is not always accurate and complete.'" Under 
these circumstances, it is hardly remarkable that the screening 
prosecutor is routinely persuaded to file criminal charges.149 
Even in cases that present some doubts, the cursory screening 
process rarely allows for immediate investigation.lsO 
Assuming there is a legal basis for criminal charges, the 
"safest" course of action is to file charges and leave the 
necessary investigation to the individual line assistant to whom 
the case is assigned. 
Despite the likelihood that the screening process does not 
produce a considered and informed charging decision, a line 
assistant may find it easier simply to prosecute the case to 
conclusion than to seek reconsideration by a superv i~or . '~~  
Moreover, some line assistants place unwarranted faith in the 
screening process and are consequently unlikely to perceive any 
necessity for reevaluation. ls2 
This fragmented decision-making is not necessarily limited 
144. See Fisher, supra note 11, a t  204. See also Kaplan, supra note 5, at 178. 
145. See Alschuler, supra note 129, a t  64 n.42. See also MILLER, supra note 11, 
at  17; Abrams, supra note 34, at  54. 
146. For example, in the United States Attorney's Office in the District of 
Columbia, the daily screening process typically involved making charging decisions, 
preparing the necessary paperwork, and appearing in court at  the initial judicial 
appearance for over 100 cases per day. 
147. See GROSMAN, supra note 52, at  46-47. 
148. David Kamm, Practical Aspects of Prosecution: The Case for the Prosecutor, 
13 TOLEDO L. REV. 299, 300 (1982). 
149. See Fisher, supra note 11, a t  208. 
150. Cf. MILLER, supra note 11, a t  4. 
151. Alschuler, supra note 129, a t  64 n.42. 
152. See Felkenes, supra note 6, a t  112-13. 
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to the screening function. Many prosecutors' offices, for reasons 
of efficiency, employ what can be termed a horizontal case 
assignment system.ls3 For example, certain line assistants 
may be assigned, for a period of time, exclusively to the 
presentation of cases to the grand jury for indictment, while 
other line assistants may be assigned exclusively to the trials 
of those same cases.'" With such an arrangement, it is easy 
for each line assistant to rationalize that any decision to 
dismiss charges should have been, or should be, made by 
another line assistant a t  another stage of the criminal justice 
process. In fact, a t  least in prosecutors' offices burdened with 
large caseloads, detailed investigation and preparation of cases 
may not take place until trial is imminent.lss As noted, 
however, by that time the earlier screening stages may be 
accorded an unjustified deference interfering with objective 
evaluation. 156 
The possibility that prosecutors will fail to dismiss 
appropriate cases is sometimes exacerbated by the motivations 
of prosecutors themselves. Some prosecutors have political or 
other ambitions,15' and consequently, they are concerned 
about their status and advancement within the prosecutors' 
office.15' That advancement may often depend upon one's 
image of being fearless about prosecuting difficult cases.ls9 
Correspondingly, line assistants who seek dismissals because of 
doubts concerning the defendants' guilt run the risk of being 
perceived as soft, fearful, and lacking the skills to win the 
tough case?' Particularly where cases generate public 
attention, the prosecutors' office may be reluctant to appear 
ame1iorati~e.l~~ In such cases, there is likely enhanced 
pressure upon the assigned line assistant to obtain a 
conviction. 16' 
Even the most conscientious of prosecutors cannot avoid 
the effects of very selective influences inherent in the criminal 
See Abrams, supra note 34, at 2-6. 
Id. at 2. 
Bubany & Skillern, supra note 18, at 489. 
See supra text accompanying notes 149-150. 
DOUGLASS, supra note 5, at 5; FRANK & FRANK, supra note 142, at 236-37. 
See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 180. 
See Felkenes, supra note 6, at 112. 
See Alschuler, supra note 129, at 64 11.42. 
Fisher, supra note 11, at 231; Utz, supra note 116, at 102. 
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 181. 
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justice process. Prosecutors rarely speak to defendants. 
Prosecutors come to know defendants from police reports and 
rap sheets, and thus think of defendants only in the context of 
the criminal accusations. By contrast, prosecutors may come t o  
know victims as real people, possibly likeable people, and very 
often persons deserving of consideration and sympathy. Quite 
naturally, prosecutors may develop loyalty to victims, and that 
loyalty may influence the prosecutors' decisions.'" 
Prosecutors also come into prolonged and recurrent contact 
with police officers. As a result, prosecutors may tend to regard 
police officers as their clients.lB4 Thus, some prosecutors may 
be reluctant to derail prosecutions, particularly where the 
police officers feel strongly about the case.165 This may be 
true despite the fact that many police officers are satisfied as t o  
the defendant's guilt at the time of the arrest, and view all 
subsequent procedures as potential occasions for the frustration 
of effective law enf0r~ement.l~~ 
In short, the prosecutor's institutional posture and 
orientation make him or her less likely to perceive doubts 
concerning the guilt of defendants?' Once an investigation 
focuses upon a particular individual, the prosecutor naturally 
examines evidence with a predisposition to  confirm his or her 
original theory of ~u1pability.l~~ Once the case proceeds to  
trial, it will probably require some truly extraordinary and 
unanticipated development to cause the prosecutor to 
reevaluate the propriety of seeking a conviction.169 And if the 
trial prosecutor is in an office which employs a horizontal case- 
assignment system, he or she may not even be privy t o  
information which should have created some doubt at an 
earlier stage of the proce~s."~ 
The result is that even a conscientious prosecutor can come 
to  believe, or at least to presume, that all, or virtually all, 
163. Kara S. Donahue, Note, Prosecutorial Ethics: The Case for the Per Se Rule, 
18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 416 (1990-91). 
164. Fisher, supra note 11, at 209. 
165. See William F. McDonald, !l%e Prosecutor's Domain, in THE PROSECUTOR 15, 
32-42 (William F. McDonald ed., 11 Sage Criminal Justice System Annuals, 1979); 
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 182. 
166. GROSMAN, supra note 52, at 44-47. 
167. E.g., Gross, supra note 120, at 447. 
168. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRJM. L. 
BULL. 550, 552, 559-62 (1987). 
169. Zacharias, supra note 79, at 51. 
170. Jonakait, supra note 168, at 553. 
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defendants are in fact guilty.17' This conclusion receives 
constant reinforcement from the high percentage of dispositions 
by guilty pleas17' and the high conviction rate at trial.173 
The occasional acquittal can easily be accounted for by the 
irrationality of the jury, the bizarre rulings of the trial judge, 
or the objectionable tactics of defense counsel. Gradually, the 
prosecutor can come to view his or her primary obligation as 
obtaining  conviction^.'^^ The admonitional obligation to "seek 
justice" is forgotten, not because it is ignored, but because 
prosecutors equate it with obtaining convictions. 
This phenomenon of emphasizing convictions has been 
labeled "conviction psychology,"'75 and i t  is not merely a 
theoretical model. Many prosecutors do, in fact, believe their 
primary function is to secure  conviction^.'^^ Because the 
adoption of a conviction psychology frequently results from the 
institutional influences brought to bear upon prosecutors, 
veteran prosecutors are more likely than their less experienced 
colleagues t o  manifest conviction psychology.177 Nevertheless, 
these conviction-oriented values affect the entire office, both 
because the values are conveyed to newcomers,178 and 
because more experienced prosecutors dominate supervisory 
positions where much charging discretion is located. 
Needless to say, the assimilation of a conviction psychology 
by the prosecutor makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the 
prosecutor to protect the innocently accused.179 Over- 
emphasizing convictions can lead to an ends-justifies-the-means 
mentality, resulting in various forms of prosecutorial 
rniscond~ct. '~~ Because the prosecutor focuses exclusively on 
securing the conviction, there is a danger that the prosecutor 
will, for example, be improperly reluctant to disclose 
exculpatory material to the defenselgl or subtly influence 
witnesses' testimony to secure a guilty verdict.lS2 
171. Id. at 553-54; Felkenes, supra note 6, at 110. 
172. Jonakait, supra note 168, at  553-54. 
173. Id. at  554. See also FRANK & FRANK, supra note 142, at  239. 
174. Felkenes, supra note 6, at 110. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 109. 
177. Id. at  111. 
178. Fisher, supra note 11, at  206. 
179. See id. at 206; Felkenes, supra note 6, at  110. 
180. See Fisher, supra note 11, a t  199, 208; Jonakait, supra note 168, at  550. 
181. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 696-97 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
182. Cf. Stephan Landsman, Reforming Adversary Procedure: A Proposal 
6691 PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 691 
Of course, for all litigators, the temptation to engage in 
intentional misconduct, as well as the danger of unintended 
improprieties, arises from the adversary system's emphasis 
upon ~ i c t 0 r y . l ~ ~  In the case of the prosecutor, the emphasis 
upon victory inherent in a n  adversary ethic not only motivates 
potential misconduct, but also steers the prosecutor inexorably 
toward a conviction psychology.184 As a result, the adversary 
process makes it difficult for the prosecutor to protect the 
i ~ 0 c e n t . l ~ ~  
The reaction of prosecutors to the behavior of defense 
counsel also impacts upon the prosecutofs adoption of a n  
adversary ethic. The obligation of defense counsel is primarily, 
if not exclusively, to the defendant? Consequently, defense 
counsel will seek to advance the causes of truth and 
substantive justice only coincidentally, i.e., when those goals 
are consistent with the personal interests of the defendant.ls7 
With the adoption of an adversary ethic, some prosecutors 
advocate extreme positions in an attempt to counterbalance the 
position of defense c0unse1.l~ Some prosecutors also respond 
in kind to defense tactics, feeling that adversary combat cannot 
be fought with unequal weaponry.'" 
Given all of these influences, it should be clear that  a 
prosecutor's decision regarding the existence and nature of self- 
imposed charging standards depends fundamentally upon the 
prosecutor's position on the appropriateness of an  adversary 
model of prosecutorial behavior. A brief examination of the 
adversary system, and its relevance to a prosecutor's ethic, is 
thus in order. 
IV. THE ADVERSARY MODEL 
During my tenure in the United States Attorney's Office in 
Concerning the Psychology of Memory and the Testimony of Disinterested Witnesses, 
45 U .  P I ~ ' .  L. REV. 547, 553-56 (1984). 
183. See Marshall, supra note 133, at  921. 
184. See Cox, supra note 18, a t  414; Fisher, supra note 11, at 208; Utz, supra 
note 116, at 103, 108; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, at  1557-58. 
185. Cox, supra note 18, at  415. This is particularly true a t  trial, which is an 
inherently competitive process. See Zacharias, supra note 79, at  107-08. 
186. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 11, a t  208 n.53. 
187. See, e.g., NISSMAN & HAGEN, supra note 7, at  2; Frankel 11, supra note 
137, at 1037-38; Uviller, supra note 78, a t  1072-73. 
188. See Fisher, supra note 11, a t  252. 
189. See F ~ K  & FRANK, supra note 142, a t  233-34; Fisher, supra note 11, a t  
210-11. 
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Washington, D.C., it was the practice for trial assistants to 
circulate post-trial memoranda to other trial assistants. These 
memoranda would detail the charges, the verdict and the jury 
members,lgO as well as comments from the assistant who 
tried the case. I recall receiving such a memorandum from a 
friend and colleague reporting on an acquittal, in which he 
commented that he believed that the jury's verdict was correct. 
Of course, no one would enjoy confessing to losing a case that 
should have been won, but I knew the author of the 
memorandum well enough to doubt that his comment was 
made merely to insulate his ego and prestige. I remember 
wondering, given his view of the case, how he would have felt if 
he had obtained a conviction, and I asked him that very 
question. He responded that he would have felt just fine, thank 
you, because it was the jury's province to decide guilt or 
innocence. In fact, he added, it would have been improper for 
him to interfere with the jury's prerogative by dismissing the 
case. 
Had we been representing private clients, there could be no 
quarrel with my colleague's position. It summarized the 
essence of the adversary system: it is not for litigants' counsel 
to duplicate the function of the trier of fact. Indeed, such 
duplication is not only not required; it is not permitted. It is 
somehow seen as intrusive upon the exclusive province of the 
trier of fact. Like presumptively selecting from the menu for 
one's date without leave to do so, it is simply not done. 
In  the context of a prosecutor, who does not represent a 
private client, the same ethic prevails in some circles. Some 
prosecutors insist that the prosecutor's obligation is to leave 
the question of guilt or innocence to the jury.lgl Even when 
the prosecutor has doubts about the defendant's guilt or 
concerning the truth of the government's evidence, the jury 
must make the factual de~ i s i0n . l~~  
190. Because jurors would serve for several weeks, it was useful to know, during 
jury selection, whether potential jurors had returned a guilty or not guilty verdict, 
and the circumstances in which they did so, earlier in their term. 
191. See, e-g., Uviller, supra note 85, at 1155-59. 
192. See Harvey A. Schneider & Stephen D. Marks, The Contrasting Ethical 
Duties of the Prosecutor and Defense Attorney in Criminal Cases, 7 U. WEST L.A. 
L. REV. 120, 126 (1975). Some advocates of the adversary model of prosecutorial 
behavior assert, however, that a prosecutor should not prosecute where "there is a 
substantial likelihood that the defendant is innocent." Uviller, supra note 85, at 
1159. 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
This position stems from an unfounded faith in the 
adversary system. Many who defend the adversary system tout 
it as a superior process for discovering the truth.lg3 For some 
the adversary system has become not merely a means to that 
end, but rather a glorified end in and of itself.lg4 On this 
view, lawyers are servants to the system, and it is essential 
that they fulfill their function as advocates and not seek to 
perform roles the system assigns t o  other functionaries. 
Those who apply this ethic to prosecutors believe prose- 
cutors should identify themselves as advocates for the 
community "other than the defendant."lg5 Thus, because the 
prosecutor functions in an adversary system against an 
advocate for the defendant, he or she has an advocate's duty to 
present the doubtful case in the strongest possible way against 
the defendant.lg6 The prosecutor's function is not to deter- 
mine truth, as he or she has no special abilities to  perform that 
function.lg7 In short, prosecutors are not merely permitted to 
rely on the process, they are required to  defer to it.lg8 
But why such faith in the adversary system? It is true that 
the adversary system is an integral component of a dispute 
resolution process designed to ascertain the truth.lgg At best, 
however, we just assume that the adversary system is a 
valuable contributor t o  this and at worst we engage 
193. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, From Private Fights Toward Public Justice, 51 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 516, 517 (1976) [hereinafter Frankel I]; Frankel 11, supra note 137, 
at  1052; Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective 
Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 68 
(1986); Stark, supra note 73, at  971; Uviller, supra note 78, a t  1067; Zacharias, 
supra note 79, at  53. 
194. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT, Preamble (Roscoe 
Pound-Am. Trial Lawyers Found. Revised Draft 1982) (referring to the adversary 
system as a system which "helps to preserve and enhance our dignity as 
individuals" and as an "express[ion] [of] fundamental American values," and 
extolling "all American lawyers" to commit "to strengthening that system as the 
embodiment of the constitutional values inherent in the administration of justice in 
the United States"). See also LUBAN, supra note 138, at  58 ("[Tlhere is a tendency 
among many people to treat reservations about the adversary system as assaults 
on the American Way."). 
195. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversary System, 37 
MERCER L. REV. 647, 665 (1986). 
196. See Fisher, supra note 11, a t  231. 
197. See id.; Uviller, supra note 78, at  1079. 
198. Cf. Uviller, supra note 78, at 1078; Uviller, supra note 85, a t  1158-59. 
199. See, e.g., Tehan v. United states a rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). 
200. Cfi Gary Goodpaster, On The Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 
78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 118 (1987). 
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in  self-deception or even hypocrisy in proclaiming the truth- 
revealing virtues of our adversarial process.201 
The fact is that, because we do not know "the truth" in any 
absolute sense, we cannot measure the truth-revealing 
capabilities of the adversary system except on the basis of 
anecdotal accounts and intuition.202 But the idea that trial by 
combat, whatever the weapons, will reliably produce truth is 
both counter-intuitive203 and contradicted by experience.204 
Certainly the parties and their advocates are not pursuing the 
truth; they are pursuing As trial lawyers and 
judges are likely to acknowledge, "the fairness of the 
procedures is not a guarantee of the truth-finding capacity of 
trials."206 False testimony is sometimes believed, and 
accurate testimony is sometimes rejected?'? Thus, in the 
view of critics of the adversary system, truth can only result as 
a coincidental byproduct of the process,"08 and consequently, 
truth is an insufficiently valued and not necessarily attained 
objective of the process.209 
The impact of lawyers upon the process cannot be 
overstated. Verdicts, especially those of juries, are sometimes 
influenced by the divergent skills, and sometimes even 
personalities, of the advocates?1° A skillful lawyer can 
frequently create the appearance that a perfectly honest and 
accurate witness is confused or even lying.211 Consistent with 
legal and ethical requirements, skillful lawyers can block the 
presentation of truthful and accurate evidence.212 Indeed, 
201. Frankel 11, supra note 137, at 1036, 1039. 
202. Saltzburg, supra note 195, at 655. See also LUBAN, supra note 138, at  68. 
203. LUBAN, supra note 138, at 70; Goodpaster, supra note 193, a t  64; Zacharias, 
supra note 79, at 55. 
204. Frankel 11, supra note 137, at 1034. 
205. See Frankel 11, supra note 137, a t  1035; Goodpaster, supra note 193, at  71 
& n.66; Goodpaster, supra note 200, at  122, 124. 
206. Goodpaster, supra note 200, at  129. 
207. See, e.g., Richard Eggleston, What Is Wrong with the Adversary System?, 49 
AUSTL. L.J. 428, 431 (1975). 
208. See Frankel 11, supra nt te 137, a t  1037. 
209. See, e.g., Frankel 11, supra note 137, at  1032; Gerber, supra note 140, a t  4. 
See also Saltzburg, supra note 195, at  651; Stark, supra note 73, a t  972. 
210. See FRANK & FRANK, supra note 142, a t  231; Frankel I, supm note 193, at 
518; Gerber, supra note 140, at  5; Goodpaster, supra note 193, at  59. 
211. See FRANK & FRANK, supra note 142, at  227; Eggleston, supra note 207, at 
431-32; Frankel 11, supra note 137, at  1048. 
212. See LUBAN, supra note 138, a t  57; Frankel I, supra note 193, a t  519; 
Frankel 11, supra note 137, at 1038; Patterson, supra note 106, a t  524. 
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such amoral skills are admired by members of the bench and 
bar213 and highly sought after by inexperienced lawyers and 
students. 
Additionally, while the adversary system assumes equal 
competence of the opposing advocates,214 this is frequently 
not the case.215 Particularly in criminal cases, the ability of 
the adversarial system t o  produce a just result is dubious 
where defense counsel lacks comparable skill and dedication to 
that of the prosecutor.216 I have had the simultaneous 
pleasure and difficulty of encountering some extremely talented 
and dedicated criminal defense lawyers as adversaries, but that 
was certainly not always the case. Assigned counsel, in 
particular, include some of the best and worst of the defense 
bar.217 Unfortunately, the extent of inadequate criminal 
defense representation is not insignificant.21g 
The corollary of this phenomenon is the proposition that a 
superior performance by a prosecutor can enhance the prospect 
of conviction, quite independent of the merits of the case.219 
In fact, prosecutors sometimes take advantage of inferior 
adversaries to accomplish results not otherwise attainable.220 
And, under an adversary model, there is no incentive for 
prosecutors t o  rescue defendants from the inadequacies of 
defense counsel.221 
213. See Frankel 11, supra note 137, a t  1034. 
214. David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U .  CIN. L. REV. 1, 
2 (1973); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 543, 547 (1983). 
215. Schwartz, supra note 214, at 547. 
216. Goodpaster, supra note 193, a t  65; Zacharias, supra note 79, a t  66. 
217. Kaplan, supra note 5, at  187. 
218. See Bazelon, supra note 214, at  2; Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of 
Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our 
System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 227, 227 (1973); Goodpaster, supra note 
193, at 72-73. Judge Bazelon characterizes some assigned counsel as "courthouse 
regulars" who lack the motivation to make more than perfunctory efforts for 
limited fees, "uptown lawyers" who specialize in other areas of the law and accept 
appointments only out of a sense of duty, and "neophytes" who have no experience 
in any area of the law. Bazelon, supra note 214, at  8-13. By contrast, although 
many prosecutors are inexperienced, they do quickly gather specialized experience 
in the criminal area, and a lack of motivation is an infrequent problem. 
219. See Zacharias, supra note 79, at 52 & 11.27. 
220. See FREEDMAN I, supra note 12, at 88-89; Bazelon, supra note 214, a t  15. 
See also Kaplan, supra note 5, a t  186 (suggesting that, in certain circumstances, 
prosecutors are more likely to bring criminal charges if they know the defendant is 
represented by unskilled counsel). 
221. See Bazelon, supra note 214, at  15. From an adversarial perspective, the 
only concern a prosecutor should have is that the defendant's conviction will be 
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Insofar as the justification for a system of dispute 
resolution is the discovery of truth, perhaps the best defense of 
the adversary system is that there appear to be no superior 
 alternative^.^^ Indeed, whatever one thinks of the adversary 
system, i t  is here to stay.223 But even assuming that the 
adversary system is a superior system for guiding the private 
practitioner, it does not necessarily follow that it  is a valuable 
standard for prosecutorial behavior. The adversary system that 
prosecutors must accept as governing the world in which they 
function is not necessarily what they should embrace as  their 
professional ethic. 
In  fact, some rationales for the adversary system have 
little or no application to the prosecutor. For example, one view 
of the adversary system is that it permits the clients to 
participate in the dispute resolution process.224 Prosecutors 
do not have private clients, and thus this rationale is not 
applicable to the government in criminal prosecutions.'* 
Another rationale frequently offered for the adversary 
system-particularly in the context of criminal defense-is that 
it functions in conjunction with the attorney-client privilege to 
foster unrestrained communication between defendants and 
their l a~ye r s . "~  Again, because prosecutors do not represent 
private clients, this rationale is not applicable to them.227 
overturned because of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court imposed upon defendants advancing such claims the 
dual burden of establishing, first, that counsel's performance was so defective as to 
overcome a strong presumption of competence, id. a t  688, 696, and second, that the 
defendant was prejudiced to the extent that there was a reasonable probability 
that the outcome would have been different but for counsel's errors, id. a t  691-92, 
694. This standard makes it very difficult for defendants to advance successful 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 193, at  
73. Correspondingly, this standard creates a very high threshold before adversarial 
prosecutors will become concerned that the ineffectiveness of defense counsel will 
jeopardize convictions. 
222. See LUBAN, supra note 138, at  68, 92. 
223. See Uviller, supra note 78, at  1074. 
224. See Stark, supra note 73, at  972. 
225. But see Fisher, supra note 11, at 231. Professor Fisher suggests that one 
justification for prosecutors to adopt an adversarial ethic is that i t  permits 
witnesses to "get their day in court." Id. However, witnesses, even if they are 
victims of crimes, are not parties to criminal prosecutions. Moreover, in my 
experience, only a small percentage of witnesses for the government actually desire 
to testify; most are at best dutifully compliant. Finally, the disposition of the 
majority of criminal prosecutions by plea agreements limits Professor Fisher's 
rationale to a small percentage of cases. 
226. See FREEDMAN I, supra note 12, a t  79. 
227. Id. 
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So what is a prosecutor to do? In the absence of any 
significant external constraints upon the exercise of charging 
discretion,228 in the face of a variety of self-imposed standards 
available from which to c h o o ~ e ~ ~  with the realization that 
certain institutional and psychological factors will inevitably 
push him or her t o  a conviction orientation,230 and with the 
comprehension that all lawyers function in a system with an 
overarching adversarial ethic:31 what should a prosecutor 
adopt as his or her own charging standard? Some 
recommendations follow in the next part of this article. 
It is often said that the prosecutor serves a dual role, 
functioning both as an advocate for the government and as an 
administrator of justice.232 The prosecutor is assigned both 
the quasi-judicial role of protecting the innocent and the 
advocate's role of pursuing  conviction^.^^ This presents the 
prosecutor with difficult questions in attempting to assign and 
b dance these apparently conflicting roles 
Some have suggested that each of these roles assumes 
prominence at different stages of the criminal process, with the 
prosecutor exercising a judicial role in determining whether or  
not to prosecute, and thereafter functioning as a zealous 
advocate in a quest for convictions.235 Such a theory may 
have some descriptive value regarding the behavior of some 
prosecutors, but there is surely no reason why the prosecutor's 
obligation to "seek justice" should disappear once the defendant 
has been charged.2s6 Additional information may come to  the 
prosecutor's attention in the serious preparation that occurs 
228. See discussion supra part I. 
229. See discussion supra part 11. 
230. See discussion supra part 111. 
231. See discussion supra part IV. 
232. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 3.8 cmt.; ABA PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS, supra note 76, Standard 3-l.l(b); Edwards, supra note 5, at 511; 
Frampton, supra note 60, at 7; Fuller & Randall, supra note 3, at  1218; Vorenberg 
I, supra note 8, at 1557; Donahue, supra note 163, at 407. 
. 233. FRANK & FRANK, supra note 142, at  233-34; NISSMAN & HAGEN, supra note 
7, at 2; Edwards, supra note 5, at 511; Fisher, supra note 11, at  216; Frampton, 
supra note 60, at  7; Zacharias, supra note 79, at  107. 
234. Fisher, supra note 11, at 217; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, at 1557. 
235. Whitney N. Seymour, Jr., Why Prosecutors Act Like Prosecutors, 11 REC. 
AsS'N B. CITY N.Y. 302, 312-13 (1956). 
236. Fisher, supra note 11, at 224-26. 
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immediately before trial, or even during the trial itself. Indeed, 
t h e  Model Code describes t he  ethical  prosecutor's 
nonadversarial function as extending to the trial itself.237 
In the absence of such a simplistic solution, the prosecutor 
is left with an ongoing schizophrenia, acting simultaneously as 
an advocate and a minister of justice. As a result, the 
prosecutor is faced with a dilemma. He or she must determine 
which role will take priority. While this dilemma is often 
confronted in an issue-specific fashion, it manifests itself more 
fundamentally in the prosecutor's perception of his or her 
primary role as either a judicial officer or as a law enforcement 
advocate.2s8 The overarching ethical prescription of zealous 
advocacy tends to create the latter self-image,23g an image 
which is constantly reinforced by the forces of the adversary 
criminal pro~ess.~" 
But even if one assumes that the prosecutor is primarily a 
zealous advocate, there is still a question as to the identity of 
the prosecutor's client. Prosecutors do not have individual, 
identifiable clients.241 They are lawyers for the state. As such, 
prosecutors represent the public interest.242 Prosecutors 
represent the interests of society as a whole, including the 
interests of defendants as members of that But 
without direction from a specific client, the prosecutor must 
make the client's decisions; the prosecutor must define the 
public interest in specific cases.2M 
If prosecutors truly accept their obligation to define the 
public interest they represent, the apparent conflict between 
zealous advocacy on behalf of the state and "seeking justice" 
disappears. Neither the state nor the public interest is served if 
237. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, EC 7-13 (For the text of this section, see supra 
note 75.). 
238. See Jay A. Sigler, The Prosecutor: A Comparative Functional Analysis, in 
THE PROSECUTOR 53, 55 (William F. McDonald ed., 11 Sage Criminal Justice 
System Annuals, 1979) (reporting that of 36 prosecutors responding to 
questionnaires, 15 regarded themselves as judicial officers, 14 regarded themselves 
as law enforcement officers, and 7 regarded themselves as independent of both the 
judiciary and the executive). 
239. See Zacharias, supra note 79, at 52. 
240. See supra text accompanying notes 141-189. 
241. Prosecutors do not represent particular individuals, including crime victims 
or police officers. Corrigan, supm note 78, a t  537; Kress, supra note 25, at  107. 
242. See DOUGLASS, supra note 5, at 31; Edwards, supra note 5, at  511. 
243. NISSMAN & HAGEN, supra note 7, at 7; Corrigan, supra note 78, at 538-39. 
244. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, EC 7-13. Cf. Fisher, supra note 11, at 220- 
23. 
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the innocent are convicted.245 Thus, prosecutors who 
indiscriminately seek convictions violate not only the "seek 
justice" prong of their ethical obligation; they violate the 
"zealous advocacy" prong as well. Zealous advocacy must be on 
behalf of the client's interest, and the only legitimate interest 
of the prosecutor's client is assuring that justice is done. 
Characterizing the prosecutor's obligation as a dual one- 
representing the state and "seeking justice"-suggests that the 
state has some interest other than justice. But this is only true 
if the prosecutor defines society's interests more broadly than 
the accomplishment of justice. However, if the prosecutor 
properly focuses upon the interests of society as nothing more 
nor less than "seeking justice," then the obligation of the 
prosecutor is singular and clear: it is to  accomplish justice by 
prosecuting only the 
The admonition to "seek justice" is meaninglessly 
redundant if it means only that the prosecutor is prohibited 
from violating other, specific ethical rules.247 The task for the 
prosecutor-is to give content to  the "seek justice" admonition. 
Unfortunately, the dual-obligation formula for prosecutorial 
behavior minimizes the content of the "seek justice" prong by 
juxtaposing it with the "zealous advocacy" prong. 
In truth, the prosecutor is instructed t o  "seek justice," not 
as a check upon his or her advocacy, but rather as a direction 
for its exercise. The prosecutor is commanded, by virtue of the 
interests he or she represents, to discriminate among those 
who may suffer the consequences of formal criminal accusation 
and possible conviction. The prosecutor, like it or not, 
determines the fate of many individuals accused of crimes,248 
and thus, the conscientious prosecutor is the best protection 
against unjust accusations and convictions.249 
The potential, dire consequences-even short of con- 
viction-to the wrongfully accused have already been touched 
upon.250 But the most unthinkable injustice-the conviction of 
an innocent individual-must surely be unacceptable t o  the 
conscientious prosecutor.251 Yet cases exist where this has 
245. Jonakait, supra note 168, at 551; Saltzburg, supra note 195, at 665. 
246. See Zacharias, supm note 79, at 50. 
247. Fisher, supra note 11, at 218-19. 
248. Vorenberg I, supra note 8, at 1522. 
249. Corrigan, supra note 78, at 537. 
250. See supra text accompanying notes 10-16. 
251. Cf. Corrigan, supra note 78, at 540. 
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occurred.252 Such occurrences may be rare, but it is naive to 
believe that such cases do not go undetected and uncorrected. 
The fallibility of the human actors in the process-from 
witnesses t o  jurors-makes such possibilities real. Indeed, the 
burden placed upon the government to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt is a tacit acknowledgement of both the 
gravity and plausibility of erroneous convictions.253 
If the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is a necessary 
cushion against erroneous convictions by the trier of fact, then 
how can prosecutors, in pursuit of their obligation to  "seek 
justice," impose any lower standard upon themselves? 
Prosecutors do not serve the interests of society by pursuing 
cases where the prosecutors themselves have reasonable doubts 
as to the factual guilt of the  defendant^.^" There is surely no 
reason to believe the jury is better able to  determine guilt or 
innocence than the prosecutor.255 The jury system may be the 
best available alternative for determining guilt or innocence at 
trial, but it does not follow that we must suffer delusions about 
the jury's unassailable reliability.256 Prosecutors routinely . 
report, at least privately, on jury error following acquittals. 
There is nothing to justify the extraordinary trust prosecutors 
place in those same juries when prosecutors pursue cases as to 
which the prosecutors themselves have reasonable 
The unacceptability of deferring to the jury is further 
manifested by the fact that only a small percentage of cases 
actually proceed to trial. Most cases are disposed of by guilty 
pleas. Indeed, a dominant factor in prosecutorial discretion is 
the need t o  dispose of and the primary vehicle to 
accomplish that end is plea bargaining. The same prosecutors 
who would defer to the jury the scrutiny of determining guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt are simultaneously frustrating the 
jury's prerogative by disposing of cases prior to And 
252. See FRANK & FRANK, supra note 142, at  31. 
253. Goldstein, supra note 56, at 1153; Saltzburg, supra note 195, at  655. 
254. Corrigan, supra note 78, at  540. 
255. Gross, supra note 120, at 446. 
256. See Kamm, supra note 148, at  303. 
257. This is especially troubling given the fact that jurors sometimes trust and 
defer to prosecutors, and assume that prosecutors have determined-perhaps on the 
basis of additional information not available to the jury-that the defendant is 
guilty. See Gross, supra note 120, at 448. Thus, it is entirely possible that both 
the prosecutor and the jury will have deferred, at  least in part, to the presumed 
independent determination of guilt made by the other. 
258. Cox, supra note 18, a t  391. 
259. See FREEDMAN I ,  supra note 12, at 86-88; Alschuler, supra note 129, at 63- 
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because the "generosity" of plea offers is normally greatest in 
the cases with the least likelihood of producing convictions at 
the greatest pressures to plead guilty will fall on 
those defendants who may be Prosecutors who, in 
their zeal to dispose of weak cases, offer seductive incentives to 
plead guilty while failing to satisfy themselves beyond a 
reasonable doubt of defendants' guilt are ignoring the danger of 
producing erroneous convictions in violation of their prime 
ethical directive.262 
For all of these reasons, the conscientious prosecutor, in 
zealous pursuit of society's interest in justice, does not and 
should not pursue cases unless personally satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the defendants' But a prosecutor 
need not come to this conclusion exclusively within the 
adversary model. In other words, while this conclusion can be 
derived from an identification of the legitimate interests of 
society as the prosecutor's client, many prosecutors more 
faithfully attain the goal of "seeking justice" by rejecting the 
adversary model entirely. 
It is true that the prosecutor functions in an adversary 
system and is opposed by lawyers zealously advocating the 
private interests of their clients. It is also true that prosecution 
is not for the diffident. But simply because one must have 
adversarial skills to function effectively does not mean that one 
must adopt an adversary ethic. We rarely think of trial judges 
as adversaries, but they surely exercise adversarial skills, 
persuading lawyers and parties to perform certain tasks in 
certain ways, and defending their decisions from appellate 
reversal by the adversarial skills exercised in crafting their 
64; Vorenberg I, supra note 8, at 1556. 
260. See Utz, supra note 116, at 108. 
261. FREEDMAN I, supra note 12, at 87; Alschuler, supra note 129, a t  60. 
262. See Alschuler, supra note 129, a t  62. 
263. FREEDMAN I, supra note 12, at 85; FREEDMAN 11, supra note 12, at 219. 
Professor Freedman has also advocated an ethical proscription, to be enforced with 
disciplinary sanctions, against prosecutors who "proceed[] with a prosecution if a 
fair-minded person could not reasonably conclude, on the facts known to the 
prosecutor, that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." FREEDMAN 11, 
supra note 12, a t  221. The wisdom of imposing the "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard upon prosecutors in the form of a disciplinary rule is at least 
questionable, as Professor Freedman has acknowledged. Id. at 221-22. Such a rule 
would likely expose prosecutors to disciplinary sanctions in every case which 
resulted in an acquittal, possibly discouraging prosecutors from pursuing difficult 
but meritorious cases, and also possibly influencing judges to be more reluctant to 
grant motions for judgments of acquittal. Id. 
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opinions. All of this is perfectly acceptable provided the judges 
are objective and fair in their decision-making. 
The prosecutor, too, must exercise considerable adversarial 
skills, but this cannot justify assuming less than an objective 
posture in exercising charging discretion. The law defines guilt 
as that which is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
prosecutors pursue cases without satisfying themselves beyond 
a reasonable doubt of the defendants' guilt, they are asking the 
jury to do what the prosecutors would not do themselves. This 
is the essence of the adversary function.2B4 But this is surely 
unacceptable if the prosecutor's mission is fairly and objectively 
to expose only the guilty to criminal sanctions.265 
Ultimately, the question prosecutors must ask themselves 
is whether they wish to function as ministers of justice, o r  
merely as ministers of process. For many prosecutors, funct- 
ioning merely as a cog in the criminal justice system is quite 
simply an inadequate return on their commitment. Trusting 
solely in the criminal justice system t o  protect the innocent-in 
the face of convincing evidence of that system's inability to do 
so in all cases-is too great a concession to the adversary model 
of behavior, a model that takes its origin and justification from 
the very different circumstances of the lawyer representing a 
private client. 
Rather than mischaracterizing the public prosecutor as an 
adversary with additional, conflicting obligations, it would be 
more accurate and beneficial for prosecutors to  view themselves 
as skilled adversaries exercising quasi-judicial functions. The 
accomplishment of justice should not be the fortuitous residue 
of the process in which the prosecutor participates; it should be 
the guiding principle for every aspect of the prosecutorid 
function. The prosecutor must accept personal responsibility for 
the accomplishment of justice, and the fundamental aspect of 
this imperative is that the prosecutor must refuse to accept the 
risk of conviction of individuals when the prosecutor has 
reasonable doubts as to their 
264. See supra notes 191-198 and accompanying text. 
265. See Corrigan, supra note 78, at 541. 
266. In my tenure as a prosecutor, the issue materialized on several occasions, 
but the following situation stands clearly in my recollection. The victim, a short, 
handicapped gentleman in his late fifties, was working in his backyard under his 
car. Two men approached him, exhibited handguns, and took the victim into his 
otherwise unoccupied house. Once inside, the two men robbed and gratuitously beat 
the victim, shot him and left, apparently believing the victim to be dead. A 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
As discussed earlier, many prosecutors are drawn to the 
quasi-judicial role of the prosecutor precisely because of qualms 
about the adversary function of lawyers for private clients.267 
But many do not share those qualms. And all prosecutors are 
subjected to influences which naturally steer them to a 
conviction psychology and an advocate's role.268 Thus, if 
prosecutors' offices are serious about the quasi-judicial ethic of 
the prosecutor, it is necessary that prosecutors be oriented to 
that view.26g Only when prosecutors are encouraged and 
trained to assume fully their obligation to seek justice will the 
best protection against unjust charges and convictions be fully 
neighbor found the victim alive, an ambulance was called, and the victim 
ultimately survived following surgery and a two-week hospitalization. Prior to his 
emergency surgery, the victim described the two men, in relevant part, as being 
about 5'5" to 5'8" tall and in their late twenties. He also claimed to have seen one 
of the men playing basketball in the neighborhood prior to the crime. 
About one month after the crime, with the investigation having thus far 
produced nothing tangible, the victim telephoned the police and reported that one 
of the two assailants was at that moment playing basketball a t  an outdoor 
basketball court in the victim's neighborhood. The police rushed to the 
neighborhood, the victim pointed out the defendant as one of his assailants, and 
the police arrested the defendant, a 17 year old male standing about six feet tall. 
The case was screened and approved by a senior prosecutor. Another prosecutor 
presented the case to the grand jury and obtained an indictment. The case was 
then assigned to me for trial. 
I spoke to the victim on three separate occasions. In his own mind, his 
identification was unshakable. He dismissed his earlier descriptions as erroneous, 
claiming, quite credibly, that he could not remember his prior descriptions because 
of his medical distress at the time. He insisted that the prior descriptions were 
inaccurate for the same reason. He claimed a vivid memory of the crime and his 
two assailants, and described the event and the assailants in impressive detail. He 
would have made an excellent witness. 
After a couple of nearly sleepless nights and a great deal of uncertainty, I 
persuaded my supervisor that we should dismiss the case. Two fads which I have 
not yet mentioned influenced my decision. First, the defendant had no criminal or 
juvenile convictions or arrests. This crime was heinous. It seemed most unlikely 
that an individual who could commit such a crime would not have a track record 
of escalating criminality. Second, the defendant was assigned a lawyer whom I 
regarded as minimally effective. 
The case was not a strong one for the government, but it could have been won. 
But it was winning that frightened me. Ironically, the weakness of defense counsel 
made me even more reluctant about pursuing a conviction. Ultimately, my own 
reasonable doubts about the defendant's guilt, doubts which my supervisor shared, 
or at  least endorsed, resulted in the dismissal. 
The victim, as you might imagine, was extremely displeased. The defendant 
may well have been factually guilty. The adversary process was circumvented. And, 
in my view, justice was done. 
267. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text. 
268. See discussion supra part 111. 
269. Fisher, supra note 11, at 257. 
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effective."' The prosecutor must appreciate that his or her 
obligation is to investigate as fully and objectively as 
possible.271 The prosecutor, especially in a horizontal case- 
assignment system, must accept the duty continually to 
reevaluate cases and reconsider charging decisions where 
appr~pr ia te .~~ '  And the prosecutor must be on constant watch 
that his or her advocate's instincts do not interfere with the 
singular goal of accomplishing justice.273 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Prosecutorial discretion has recently been targeted as an 
abuse which needs to be restrained.274 But any such abuses 
are not inherent in the exercise of prosecutorial di~cretion.''~ 
Indeed, one of the greatest dangers to the accomplishment of 
justice is the failure of prosecutors to accept the extent and 
significance of their discretion. Charging discretion, a t  least in 
the context of case-specific evaluations, is both unavoidable and 
desirable. 
In the exercise of their charging discretion, prosecutors 
must make a fundamental choice about how they view 
themselves and their roles. In order to hlfill their obligation to 
seek justice, prosecutors must shed the adversary ethic 
reserved for the private interest lawyer and impose upon 
themselves the simultaneous duty and freedom to prosecute 
only those who are, to the prosecutors' satisfaction, guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
270. See FRANK & FRANK, supra note 142, at 32. 
271. Edwards, supra note 5, at 519. 
272. Corrigan, supra note 78, at 541. 
273. See Fisher, supra note 11, at 201. 
274. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text. 
275. See, e.g., Utz, supra note 116, at 119. 
